By Ari Levin – Security Analyst, Middle East Specialist
After nearly a decade and a half of civil war, foreign interventions, collapsed cities, and shattered legitimacy, Syria has emerged from the ruins—not in peace, but in transformation. In a turn that few could have predicted five years ago, Bashar al-Assad is no longer the face of Syrian power. In his place stands a new regime—technocratic in language, military in posture, and regionally pragmatic.
This blog takes a close look at the post-Assad leadership in Syria, its internal makeup, regional ambitions, the astonishing (albeit limited) movement toward normalisation with Israel, and the ripple effects already beginning to reshape the Middle East.
I. The Fall of the Old Guard
Bashar al-Assad’s rule survived the unthinkable. From the early days of 2011 protests to the scorched-earth campaigns against opposition-held cities, Assad clung to power through brutality, foreign support, and institutional inertia. By 2025, however, two unavoidable realities forced a shift:
Iran’s weakening regional hand (following the Israel-Iran war) made its support for Assad less sustainable.
Russia’s strategic overstretch in Ukraine and internal instability curtailed its ability to maintain control over Syrian airspace and politics.
In April 2025, amidst reports of Assad’s ailing health and internal coup rumours, a military-led transitional authority known as the Syrian Stability Front (SSF) assumed power. Though portrayed as a “consensual retirement” by state media, sources within Western intelligence and Arab League circles confirm this was a quiet internal power reshuffle, blessed tacitly by Moscow and grudgingly tolerated by Tehran.
II. Meet the New Regime: The Syrian Stability Front (SSF)
The SSF presents itself as a “national unity government.” In reality, it is a tight alliance of:
General Faris al-Hamoud – Former head of the Republican Guard, now Chairman of the SSF. A pragmatic nationalist with deep ties to the UAE and Egypt.
Dr. Layla Sawas – Western-educated economist and technocrat, now Minister of Reconstruction and International Investment.
Colonel Maher Darwish – Intelligence chief, head of the newly formed Syrian Homeland Security Directorate.
Sheikh Yusuf al-Hinnawi – A Sunni religious figure appointed as a public bridge to tribal leadership in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.
Suleiman Majid – Alawite representative tasked with preventing a sectarian backlash from the pro-Assad loyalist base.
Gone are the days of one-man rule. The SSF is a hybrid junta, aiming to present a post-sectarian, post-conflict face to the world while maintaining tight internal control.
Their stated objectives:
Rebuild critical infrastructure and attract Gulf capital.
Disarm or integrate militias under a national military framework.
Limit Iranian proxy activity to reduce Western sanctions.
Open dialogue with international stakeholders, including Israel.
III. Normalisation with Israel: From Taboo to Tactical Dialogue
Perhaps the most startling development has been the opening of indirect communication channels between the SSF and Israeli defence officials.
Why the Change?
Shared strategic interest: Both countries seek to limit Iranian militancy and Hezbollah’s entrenchment in southern Syria.
Economic motives: The SSF wants access to Jordanian and Israeli infrastructure to export electricity and goods via Haifa’s port.
Political optics: Syria, like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, recognises that rapprochement with Israel buys favour in Washington and opens Gulf wallets.
While no official statements have been made, multiple reputable outlets (including Haaretz, Al-Monitor, and The Times of London) have reported quiet meetings in Cyprus, Jordan, and the UAE between Israeli intelligence representatives and Syrian envoys.
What Normalisation Could Look Like:
Security cooperation: Targeting ISIS remnants and Iranian proxies.
Demilitarised buffer zones: Reinforced in the Golan, potentially monitored by neutral observers.
Humanitarian deals: Return of Syrian POWs and joint recovery of missing persons (from both sides).
Reconstruction deals: Gulf-funded projects with Israeli contractors involved discreetly.
Caveats remain. The Syrian public is still broadly anti-Israel. Hezbollah and Iran will fiercely oppose any agreement. But the fact that these conversations are happening at all is seismic.
IV. Domestic Policy Shifts Under the SSF
Security
The SSF has launched aggressive operations against ISIS cells in the Badia desert.
It has begun dismantling Iranian militia outposts near Damascus and in Daraa—actions previously unthinkable under Assad.
Russian military police remain in Tartus and Latakia, but in an advisory role.
Economic Policy
A National Reconstruction Bank has been established, reportedly with Emirati seed funding.
China has offered low-interest infrastructure loans through its Belt and Road framework—although Syria is treading carefully to avoid excessive debt.
The SSF is seeking observer status in the Arab Monetary Fund.
Civil Rights and Governance
Limited press freedom reforms have been announced, though critics call them cosmetic.
Detainees from the early years of the civil war are slowly being released in batches.
Education reforms are underway, replacing Ba’athist ideology with a new "Civic Unity Curriculum" promoted by Layla Sawas.
While the state remains authoritarian, the tone is markedly different: less ideological, more strategic, and acutely aware of its need for legitimacy abroad.
V. Regional Reaction: Shock, Opportunity, and Suspicion
Israel
Cautiously optimistic. Jerusalem’s defence establishment views the new regime as “the best Syria since 1973” from a stability perspective. Yet no illusions exist—Israel will continue to operate militarily against any Iranian presence on Syrian soil.
Iran
Furious. Tehran has lost a key client. In response, the IRGC has redeployed Quds Force units toward Iraq and Lebanon, and increased pressure on Hezbollah to act as its spearhead in Levantine affairs.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE
Welcoming. Both have already sent diplomatic envoys to Damascus and are reportedly leading a $4.5 billion reconstruction fund in partnership with Egypt and Jordan. Riyadh sees an opportunity to pull Syria out of the Iranian orbit, just as it has done with Iraq in recent years.
Russia
Reluctantly supportive. Moscow sees the SSF as a stabilising force that can secure its naval base in Tartus and protect remaining influence in Syria without demanding further military expenditure.
Turkey
Nervous. Ankara’s longstanding goals in northern Syria are now under threat. The SSF has called for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Idlib and Afrin, and has expressed willingness to work with Kurdish factions under a Syrian federal structure—something Turkey fiercely opposes.
VI. Global Repercussions
The United States
Washington has not yet formally recognised the SSF but has lifted select secondary sanctions to allow humanitarian aid and commercial partnerships in key sectors (energy, telecoms, health).
Behind the scenes, the CIA and Pentagon see the SSF as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism, ISIS resurgence, and Russian meddling. There are whispers of American advisors returning to bases in eastern Syria under new pretexts.
The EU
Eager to see Syrian refugees return, the EU has expressed guarded support for the new regime. Brussels is expected to approve a €1 billion refugee return and housing scheme—conditional on human rights benchmarks.
China
Seeing opportunity, China is offering infrastructure partnerships with the SSF in electricity grids, railways, and port reconstruction. However, Beijing is cautious not to provoke the U.S. or involve itself too deeply in the volatile Levant.
VII. Risks and Unknowns
While the current outlook appears promising on the surface, several critical risks could unravel Syria’s fragile rebirth:
Iranian Sabotage: Iran may activate sleeper cells or fund destabilisation operations within Syria to undermine the SSF.
Hezbollah Retaliation: If it sees Syria pivoting too close to Israel or the West, Hezbollah could launch preemptive strikes, dragging Lebanon into deeper conflict.
Internal Fragmentation: Tribal and sectarian tensions remain. A misstep by the SSF could reignite civil strife, particularly in the northeast.
Refugee Blowback: If refugee return is rushed without infrastructure and reconciliation mechanisms in place, it could lead to unrest or humanitarian disaster.
Over-dependence on Foreign Powers: The SSF walks a fine line between courting Gulf, Russian, and Chinese aid—each of which comes with strategic strings attached.
VIII. Scenarios for the Next 5 Years
Best Case:
Syria gradually normalises relations with Israel and the West, curtails Iranian influence, rebuilds key cities, and reintegrates refugees under an increasingly decentralised federal model. The country stabilises as a “buffer state” between competing blocs.
Middle Case:
Syria remains divided. Damascus flourishes under SSF rule, but the northeast remains semi-autonomous under Kurdish protection, and Idlib becomes a de facto Turkish protectorate. Proxy skirmishes persist, but no major war erupts.
Worst Case:
Iranian or Turkish-backed militias destabilise the SSF, leading to new conflict fronts. Hezbollah draws Syria back into confrontation with Israel. The country once again fragments into warlord zones, and the hope of reconstruction collapses.
Conclusion: Damascus is Breathing, but It’s Not Yet Whole
Syria’s transition from Bashar al-Assad to the Syrian Stability Front marks the end of one era—but not yet the dawn of a new one. The path forward will require deft diplomacy, regional realignment, and an honest reckoning with the ghosts of the past.
For Israel, the opportunity is immense—but fragile. For the Arab world, Syria represents a test case in how to reverse Iranian influence without regime change by force. And for the global community, it’s a litmus test for whether reconstruction, reconciliation, and realism can finally replace war in one of the most tormented countries of our time.
Damascus is breathing again. The question is: who will shape its next heartbeat?
By Ari Levin | Middle East & Security Analyst |
